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This paper asks: is it a fact that there is more violence in districts affected by Naxalite (Maoist) activity compared to those which are free of Naxalite activ-
ity? And can the existence of Naxalite activity in some districts of India, but not in others, be explained by differences in economic and social conditions? 
This study identifies districts in India in which there was significant Naxalite activity and correlating the findings with district-level economic, social, and 
crime indicators. The econometric results show that, after controlling for other variables, Naxalite activity in a district had, if anything, a dampening effect 
on its level of violent crime and crimes against women. Furthermore, even after controlling for other variables, the probability of a district being Naxalite-
affected rose with an increase in its poverty rate and fell with a rise in its literacy rate. So, one prong in an anti-Naxalite strategy would be to address the 
twin issues of poverty and illiteracy in India.
Deprivation, Violence, and Conflict:  
An Analysis of Naxalite Activity in the Districts of India
Vani K. Borooah, School of Economics and Politics, University of Ulster, Northern Ireland
1. Introduction
The successful military campaign that Nepal’s Maoists 
waged against the Nepalese monarchy and its political 
establishment has also drawn attention to the activities of 
Maoist groups in India (known, collectively, as “Naxalites”, 
after Naxalbari, the district in West Bengal where the first 
Maoist-inspired insurgency began in 1967). The Indian 
Home Ministry estimates that 91 percent of violence in 
India, and 89 percent of deaths arising from violence, are 
the result of Naxalite action (Government of India 2005, 
p.39). Moreover, the growth of Naxalite activity in India has 
been phenomenonal: from 55 districts afflicted by various 
degrees of Naxalite activity in eight states in November 
2003 to 157 districts across 13 states in 2005 (Gill 2005). In 
response to the threat posed by Naxalites, the Indian gov-
ernment set up a high-powered committee—headed by the 
Union Home Minister and having as its members the chief 
ministers of the worst-affected states (Andhra Pradesh, 
Maharashtra, Madhya Pradesh, Chattisgarh, Jharkhand, 
Bihar, Uttaranchal, Orissa, and Uttar Pradesh)—to address 
the problem. 
Referring to the workings of this Committee, the Indian 
Prime Minisiter, Manmohan Singh, pointed out that 
Naxalite insurgency should not be viewed as a purely law 
and order problem: underlying this insurgency, and lend-
ing it support, was the social and economic deprivation 
experienced by a significant part of India’s population. For 
example, as Bhatia observed (2005), a large part of Naxalite 
activities are, in fact, are “non violent” and that this feature 
of the Naxalite movement has received little attention. 
Moreover, many of these open and non-violent activities—
inter alia meetings, boycotts, marches, road blocks—are in 
pursuit of basic economic and social rights: for example, 
I am grateful to Amaresh Dubey for providing 
me with the data, to Smita Das for research as-
sistance, and to Nitin Gokhale and Ravi Palsokar 
for help and advice with this project. This paper 
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Limerick, Ireland, and I am grateful to the depart-
ment for supporting this work. An earlier version 
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land rights, minimum wages, right to use common prop-
erty resources, the right of the “lower castes” to respect 
and dignity. In consequence, combating Naxalite violence, 
arguably, requires not just strong police and military action 
but also effective measures to alleviate political, social, and 
economic deprivation and injustice.1 
Against this background, this paper, after identifying dis-
tricts in India in which there is significant Naxalite activity 
(hereafter, simply “Naxalite activity”), asks two questions: 
(1) Is it a fact that there is more violence in Naxalite-affected 
districts compared to districts which are free of Naxalite 
activity?2 (2) Can the fact that Naxalite activity exists in 
some districts of India, but not in others, be explained by 
differences in economic and social conditions? 
2. Naxalite Activity in Indian Districts
We identified, on the basis of Government of India (2005) 
and various websites (prominent among which was the 
South Asian Intelligence Review, http://www.satp.org/
satporgtp/sair/) 88 districts in ten states in which there was 
Naxalite activity.3 This estimate lies between a low of 76 dis-
tricts in nine states (Government of India, 2005) and a high 
of 157 districts in thirteen states (Gill, 2005). The Naxalite-
affected districts we identified are listed in Table 1. 
Table 1: Districts in India with Naxalite presence
State District
Andhra Pradesh Adilabad
Andhra Pradesh Anantapur
Andhra Pradesh East Godavari
Andhra Pradesh Guntur
Andhra Pradesh Karimnagar
Andhra Pradesh Khammam
State District
Andhra Pradesh Kurnool
Andhra Pradesh Mahbubnagar
Andhra Pradesh Medak
Andhra Pradesh Nalgonda
Andhra Pradesh Nizamabad
Andhra Pradesh Srikakulam
Andhra Pradesh Visakhapatnam
Andhra Pradesh Vizianagaram
Andhra Pradesh Warangal
Bihar Aurangabad
Bihar Banka
Bihar Darbhanga
Bihar Gaya
Bihar Jamui
Bihar Jehanabad
Bihar Kaimur (Bhabua)
Bihar Khagaria
Bihar Muzaffarpur
Bihar Patna
Bihar Rohtas
Bihar Sitamarhi
Chhattisgarh Bastar
Chhattisgarh Dantewada
Chhattisgarh Jashpur
Chhattisgarh Kanker
Chhattisgarh Kawardha
Chhattisgarh Rajnandgaon
Chhattisgarh Surguja
Jharkhand Bokaro
Jharkhand Chatra
Jharkhand Dhanbad
Jharkhand Garhwa
Jharkhand Giridih
1 The best predictors of civil war were low average 
incomes, low growth, and a high dependence on 
primary exports (“The Global Menace of Lo-
cal Strife,” The Economist, May 22, 2003).
2 The district is the smallest geographical unit for 
which a consistent set of data is available. There are 
593 districts in India, with a District Commisioner 
(or District Collector) acting as the administat-
ive head of each district. The median and mean 
populations of these districts were, respectively, 
1.47 and 1.73 million persons: the most and the 
least populous districts were Medinipur in West 
Bengal (population: 9,638,473) and Yanam in 
Pondicherry (population: 31,362). By focusing on 
districts, the study is able to concentrate atten-
tion on pockets of deprivation instead of viewing 
deprivation as a phenomenom affecting a state or 
a region in its entirety (Misra 2001; Kurian 2001).
3 Information on Karnatka was  obtained 
from Ramana (2005) and for Tamil 
Nadu from Viswanathan (2002).
4 Naxalite activity in India is spearheaded by two 
groups: the Communist Party Marxist-Leninist—
People’s War Group and the Maoist Communist 
Centre of India (Government of India 2005). For de-
tails of other groups and their histories see the South 
Asian Terrorist Portal (SATP), http://www.satp.org.
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State District
Jharkhand Gumla
Jharkhand Hazaribag
Jharkhand Kodarma
Jharkhand Lohardaga
Jharkhand Palamu
Jharkhand Pashchimi Singhbhum
Jharkhand Purbi Singhbhum
Jharkhand Ranchi
Karnataka Bellary
Karnataka Bidar
Karnataka Chikmagalur
Karnataka Gulbarga
Karnataka Kolar
Karnataka Raichur
Karnataka Shimoga
Karnataka Tumkur
Karnataka Udupi
Madhya Pradesh Balaghat
Madhya Pradesh Dindori
Madhya Pradesh Mandla
Madhya Pradesh Aurangabad
Madhya Pradesh Bhandara
Madhya Pradesh Chandrapur
Madhya Pradesh Gadchiroli
Madhya Pradesh Gondiya
Madhya Pradesh Nanded
Madhya Pradesh Yavatmal
Orissa Gajapati
Orissa Ganjam
Orissa Kandhamal
Orissa Kendujhar
Orissa Koraput
Orissa Malkangiri
Orissa Mayurbhanj
State District
Orissa Nabarangapur
Orissa Rayagada
Orissa Sundargarh
Tamil Nadu Dharmapuri
Tamil Nadu Viluppuram
Uttar Pradesh Chandauli
Uttar Pradesh Mirzapur
Uttar Pradesh Sonbhadra
West Bengal Bankura
West Bengal Barddhaman
West Bengal Hugli
West Bengal Medinipur
West Bengal Puruliya
West Bengal South Twentyfour Parganas
District-level data on population from the 2001 Census of 
India and Debroy and Bhandari (2004) provided us with 
further data on a number of welfare indicators in the dis-
tricts:
1.  The poverty rate: the proportion of households in a dis-
trict who are below the poverty line.5
2.  The literacy rate: the percentage of persons (who were se-
ven years of age or above) in a district who were literate.6 
3.  The immunisation rate: the proportion of 0–6 year olds 
in a district who were immunised against disease.7
4.  The infant mortality rate: deaths per 1,000 live births.8
5.  The pupil-teacher ratio: the number of pupils per teacher 
in primary schools.9
6.  The pregnancy attention rate: the proportion of women 
receiving skilled attention during pregnancy. 
7.  The sex ratio: among 0–6 year olds, the number of 
females per 1,000 males.10
8.  The safe drinking water rate: the proportion of habita-
tions in a district with safe drinking water.
5 The district level poverty rates are based on Bhan-
dari and Dubey (2003). These data are from the Gov-
ernment of India’s National Sample Survey (NSS), 
carried out under the auspices of the National Sample 
Survey Organisation (NSSO), an autonomous agency 
of the Ministry of Statistics, Government of India. 
These surveys provide representative estimates, at a 
national level and for the major Indian states, for a 
range of socio-economic indicators (Tendulkar 2007).
6 These data were from the 2001 Census. The 
literacy rate was made “gender sensitive” by adjust-
ing for differences in male and female literacy 
rates. The 2001 Census was also the source for 
the sex ratio and the female participation rate.
7 Complete immunisation involves vaccination 
of children, within the first year of life, against six 
diseases: diphtheria, pertussis, tetanus, tubercu-
losis, poliomyelitis, and measles. Source: National 
Commission on Population’s District-wise Indica-
tors, 2001, Government of India: New Delhi. This 
was also the source for data on pregnancy attention 
rate, safe drinking water, and pucca roads. 
8 The infant mortality rates are from 
the Registrar General of India.
9 Source: Selected Educational Statistics, 
2000–01, http://www.educationforallinindia.com/
selected-educational-statistics-2000-2001.pdf.
10 2001 Census for India.
321IJCV : Vol. 2 (2) 2008, pp. 317 – 333Vani K. Borooah: Deprivation, Violence, and Conflict: An Analysis of Naxalite Activity in the Districts of India
9.  The pucca road rate: the proportion of villages in a dis-
trict connected by pucca (motorable) road.
10.  The female participation rate, defined as the proportion 
of women in a district’s workforce.
When “backwardness” was measured by a district’s poverty 
rate, 85 of the 100 worst performing districts were contained 
in just seven states (Assam, Bihar, Chattisgarh, Jharkhand, 
Madhya Pradesh, Orissa, and West Bengal) and 45 districts 
were in just three states (Bihar, Jharkhand, and Orissa). In 
terms of (il)literacy, five states (Bihar, Jharkhand, Rajasthan, 
Orissa, and Uttar Pradesh) contributed 75 districts. In terms 
of immunisation rates, seven states (Arunachal Pradesh, 
Assam, Bihar, Jharkhand, Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan, 
and Uttar Pradesh) contributed 85 districts. In terms of 
infant mortality rates, four states (Madhya Pradesh, Orissa, 
Rajasthan, and Uttar Pradesh) contributed 96 districts. In 
terms of the sex ratio of 0–6 year olds, five states (Gujarat, 
Haryana, Punjab, Rajasthan, and Uttar Pradesh) contribut-
ed 74 districts. Of the 100 districts with the lowest percent-
age of women receiving skilled assistance during pregnancy, 
27 were in Uttar Pradesh and 25 were in Bihar. Lastly, of 
the 100 districts with the highest percentage of villages not 
connected to pucca roads, 30 were in Orissa and 22 were in 
Madhya Pradesh. 11
In addition to the above variables, some other variables 
were also relevant to the study of Naxalite behaviour. The 
first of these was the proportion of a district’s area which 
was under forest cover because such cover provides a favour-
able environment for conducting armed insurrection. This 
information was provided by the Forest Survey of India 
(2003). The Forest Survey of India distinguishes between 
three types of forest cover: very dense, moderately dense, 
and open forest. In this study the three types were com-
bined to provide an overall figure for forest cover.
Since the government of India reported that, “the main 
support for the Naxalite movement comes from Dalits 
(Scheduled Castes) and Adivasis (Scheduled Tribes)” (2008, 
3), the second set of variables related to the proportion of 
a district’s population that belonged to the lower social 
classes: scheduled tribes (ST), scheduled castes (SC), and the 
other backward classes (OBC).12 These data were computed 
from the 61st round of the National Sample Survey (per-
taining to 2004–05).
The rationale for the choice of the variables set out above 
is the Government of India’s belief—as exemplified by the 
title of a report it commissioned into the causes of extrem-
ism, Development Challenges in Extremist Affected Areas 
(Government of India 2008)—that issues of high poverty, 
low education, and limited employment opportunties were, 
in significant part, responsible for the growth of extremism 
in India. In this context, many of the variables used in this 
study were “developmental” variables reflecting the level of 
economic, social, and personal development of a district’s 
population. 
Crime statistics. The National Crime Records Bureau has, 
since 1953, provided crime statistics in India (relating to the 
number of reported crimes which fell under the purview of 
the Indian Penal Code) by state and district. We had avail-
able to us district level crime statistics for 1998. From these 
data, we defined three broad categories of crime:
1.  Violent crime, comprising murders, attempted murders, 
rapes, kidnappings, dacoities, robberies, burglaries, thefts, 
riots, sexual harassment, dowry deaths, and cruelty by 
husband and relatives.
2.  Anti-women crime, comprising rapes, kidnapping and 
abduction of women and girls, sexual harassment, dowry 
deaths, and cruelty by husband and relatives.
11 It should be noted that in peripheral ar-
eas, with difficult terrain, data may be less 
reliable than data for say urban areas.
12 In response to the burden of social stigma and 
economic backwardness borne by persons belonging 
to some of India’s castes, the Constitution of India 
allows for special provisions for members of these 
castes. Articles 341 and 342 include a list of castes and 
tribes entitled to such provisions and all those groups 
included in this list—and subsequent modifications 
to this list—are referred to as “Scheduled Castes” 
(SC) and “Scheduled Tribes” (ST) respectively. 
Reservations for the SC were designed to assist 
groups who had known centuries of discrimination; 
reservations for ST were designed to assist groups 
who were traditionally isolated from the modern 
world and from mainstream society. Article 340 
of the Indian Constitution empowers the govern-
ment to create another deprived group designated 
as “other backward classes” (OBC) and in 1955, fol-
lowing the report of the Kalelkar Commission, 2,339 
groups were designated as belonging to the OBC.
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3.  Public order crime, comprising riots and arson.
From the numbers of offences under each of the above 
categories we constructed the violent crime rate as the 
number of violent crimes in a district, per 10,000 of its adult 
population, and the anti-women crime rate as the number 
of crimes against women in a district, per 10,000 of its adult 
female population. 
In terms of rates of violent crime, 23 and 22 districts of the 
100 worst districts were in Madhya Pradesh and Rajasthan 
respectively, while, of the 100 worst districts in terms of 
rates of crime aganst women, 34 and 25 districts were in 
Madhya Pradesh and Rajasthan respectively. In terms of 
the number of crimes, 17 of the worst districts in terms of 
violent crime and crimes against women were in Maharash-
tra, with Andhra Pradesh and Rajasthan providing the next 
highest concentrations of violent crime districts. In terms 
of crimes against public order, 26 of the 100 districts with 
the largest number of such crimes were in Rajasthan, with 
Bihar, Kerala, and Tamil Nadu contributing, respectively, 13, 
12, and 11 districts. 
Table 2: Indicators of deprivation and rates of crime in 
Naxalite-affected versus Naxalite-free districts
Naxalite-affected 
districts
Naxalite-free 
districts
Poverty rate (%) 32 24
Literacy rate 60.1 66.6
Infant mortality rate 72.3 73.4
Immunisation rate 51.8 52.8
Pregnancy assistance 43.0 50.5
Safe drinking water 68.1 73.5
Pucca roads 44.4 35.4
Number of violent crimes 1.655 1.592
Number of crimes against women 217 198
Number of crimes against public order 222 169
Poverty rate: Percentage of population below the poverty line.
Literacy rate: Percentage of adult population which is literate.
Infant mortality rate: Deaths before the age of one per 1,000 live births.
Immunisation rate: Percentage of children fully immunised, 0–6 years of age.
Pregnancy assistance: Percentage of women reciving skilled assistance during pregnancy.
Safe drinking water: Percentage of habitations covered by safe drinking water.
Pucca roads: Percentage of villages not connected by pucca road.
Number of violent crimes: Number of murders, attempted murders, rapes, kidnappings, 
dacoities, robberies, burglaries, thefts, riots, sexual harassments, dowry deaths, and cruelty by 
husband and relatives, in the district in 1998.
Number of crimes against women: Number of rapes, kidnappings and abductions of women 
and young girls, molestations, sexual harassments, dowry deaths, and cruelty by husband and 
relatives, in the district in 1998.
Number of crimes against public order: Number of riots and cases of arson.
Table 2 compares, with respect to each of the deprivation 
indicators and crime indicators listed above, districts in 
which there was, and was not, Naxalite activity. It shows 
that the average poverty rate in Naxalite-affected districts 
was considerably higher than that in districts which did not 
have Naxalite activity (32 versus 24 percent) and the literacy 
rate in Naxalite-affected districts was considerably lower 
than that in districts which did not have Naxalite activity 
(60 versus 67 percent). Furthermore, the average numbers 
of violent crimes, crimes against women, and public order 
crimes were all higher in Naxalite-affected districts than in 
Naxalite-free districts. 
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3. Estimation Results for the Crime Equations
Naxalite activity is not the only form of armed insurrec-
tion in India. However, political violence in Jammu and 
Kashmir and in the north-eastern states of India—the 
two areas most affected by non-Naxalite insurrection—
is driven by separatist motives rather than by reasons of 
socio-economic oppression. In order not to confuse the 
two differently motivated insurrection types—Naxalite and 
non-Naxalite—the states of Jammu and Kashmir and all 
the north-eastern states were excluded from the estimation 
sample both for the crime equations (this section) and for 
the Naxalite activity equations (next section).13 Both sets of 
equations—crime and Naxalite activity—were estimated 
over all the districts in India and also over all the districts 
in the Naxalite-affected Indian states.14 
The preceding section raises the question of whether the 
level of violent crime in a district can be explained by its 
charactersistics, where these characteristics include the 
presence or absence of Naxalite activity in the district.15 
In order to examine this hypothesis we estimated, using 
district-level data for the whole of India, three econometric 
equations whose dependent variables were, respectively, the 
number in every district of: (1) violent crimes, (2) crimes 
against women, (3) crimes against public order. The equa-
tions were estimated, over all the Indian districts, as a sys-
tem of Seemingly Unrelated Regression Equations (SURE) 
in order to allow for correlation between the error terms of 
the three equations.
13 Excluded north-eastern states are: Ar-
unachal Pradesh, Assam, Meghalaya, Miz-
oram, Manipur, Nagaland, and Tripura.
14 Andhra Pradesh, Bihar, Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand, 
Karnataka, Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra, Orissa, 
Tamil Nadu, Uttar Pradesh, and West Bengal.
15 Of course, there is the possibility that, rather 
than violent crime being engendered by Nax-
alite activity, Naxalities operate in districts 
where there is already a high level of violence.
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Table 3: Regression estimates of the crime equations
District number of crimes  
for all states
District number of crimes  
for Naxalite-affected states
Violent crimes
Crimes against 
women
Crimes against 
public order
Violent crimes
Crimes against 
women
Crimes against 
public order
Naxalite activity -236.917 -41.421** -57.814 -26.562
(1.43) (2.19) (0.31) (1.35)
District poverty rate -3.051*** -0.465
(4.00) (0.76)
Proportion of the district’s population which is rural -42.310*** -1.348*** -55.342*** -1.343**
(9.71) (2.72) (9.72) (2.17)
District literacy rate 34.225*** 13.681*** 7.377*** 6.499 11.706** -1.585
(3.57) (3.81) (4.38) (0.54) (2.38) (1.28)
District literacy rate squared -0.070** -0.076*
(2.35) (1.74)
District ratio of female to male literates -33.324*** -3.890*** -9.663*** -4.605 -0.298 1.887
(3.32) (3.33) (5.42) (0.33) (0.20) (1.28)
District coverage of safe drinking water -4.404* -0.494 -1.869*** -2.690 -0.079 -0.316
(1.67) (1.64) (4.03) (0.80) (0.22) (0.90)
District male population 10.341*** 2.686*** 2.229*** 6.087* 2.487*** 1.674***
(3.77) (8.59) (11.45) (1.75) (6.55) (11.47)
District male population squared 0.031*** -0.002** 0.033*** -0.002*
(3.91) (1.99) (3.63) (1.77)
Proportion of district under forest cover 0.923 -0.219 -0.505 -2.790 -0.174 -0.079
(0.22) (0.46) (0.71) (0.48) (0.28) (0.14)
Proportion of district population belonging  
to the Scheduled Tribes
13.051*** 2.318*** 2.977*** 7.897 1.687** 0.157
(2.65) (4.16) (3.20) (1.13) (2.25) (0.20)
Proportion of district population belonging  
to the Scheduled Castes
-2.542 -0.363 2.086* -1.338 -0.825 2.470***
(0.37) (0.46) (1.69) (0.15) (0.87) (2.64)
Proportion of district population belonging  
to the Other Backward Classes
8.737** 0.235 1.629*** 3.897 -0.533 0.697
(2.51) (0.60) (2.63) (0.80) (1.03) (1.35)
Constant 3,783.779*** -176.841 274.215** 5,092.557*** -243.786 -48.865
(4.47) (1.24) (2.50) (4.71) (1.42) (0.59)
R2 0.615 0.487 0.293 0.637 0.510 0.402
LR test: χ2(11)=747 χ2(12)=451 χ2(9)=190 χ2(11)=586 χ2(12)=352 χ2(9)=225
Observations 463 463 463 334 334 334
Notes:
Seemingly Unrelated Regression Equations (SURE) estimates. Numbers in parentheses are z-scores.
*** significant at 1 percent level; ** significant at 5 percent level; * significant at 10 percent level; 
The chi-squared statistics report the result of testing the null hypotheses that all the slope coefficients are zero against the alternative hypothesis that some are non-zero.
Andhra Pradesh, Bihar, Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand, Karnataka, Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra, Orissa, Tamil Nadu, and West Bengal.
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The estimation results from the three crime equations are 
shown in Table 3. Some variables whose associated coeffi-
cients had z scores which were less than 1 were omitted from 
the equation specification: as is well known, the omission 
of such variables enhances the explanatory power of the 
equation.16 The equations for violent crime, crimes against 
women, and crimes against public order explain, respec-
tively, 62, 49, and 29 percent of the inter-district variation 
(over all the Indian districts) in the numbers of such crimes 
for India in its entirety, and 64, 51, and 40 percent of inter-
district variation for the Naxalite-affected states. 
The first point to make about the estimation results is that, 
after controlling for other factors, districts with Naxalite 
presence (listed in Table 1) had ceteris paribus lower num-
bers for violent crime and crimes against women compared 
to districts in whch there was no Naxalite activiy. As is 
well known, the Naxilite movement in India pays special 
regard to the economic and social position of disadvantaged 
groups (Dalits, Adivasis, and women) from whom it gets 
most of its support. However, it should be stressed that the 
coefficients associated with the Naxalite variable were not 
significantly different from zero. It is difficult to say why, 
after controlling for other factors, normal criminal activity is 
lower in Naxalite districts; judging from the experience of 
say, Northern Ireland, it is plausible that Naxalites—like the 
Loyalist and Republican paramilitary forces in Northern 
Ireland—also enforce law and order in their areas of influ-
ence (Knox 2001). 
The second point is that districts in India (whether Naxalite 
or non-Naxalite), with a larger proportion of their popula-
tion living in rural areas had lower levels of violent crime 
and of crimes against women compared to more urbanised 
districts: a percentage point increase in the proportion of 
a districts’s rural population would lead, on average, the 
number of violent crimes in a district to fall by 42 and 
crimes against women to fall by one for India in its entirety, 
and by 55 and one for the Naxalite-affected states (figures 
per 10,000 population).
The third point is that the poverty rate (i.e. the proportion 
of households in the district who were poor), whether or 
not the district was Naxalite-affected, had no bearing on 
the number of violent crimes, or on the number of crimes 
against women. However, the level of poverty did have a sig-
nificant effect on the number of crimes against public order 
(riots and arson): the smaller the proportion of households 
in the district who were poor, the larger the number of 
crimes against public order.17 
The fourth point is that, for India in its entirety, higher 
levels of literacy were associated with a higher number of 
crimes, of all three types, in a district. A percentage point 
increase in the literacy rate was associated with an addi-
tional 34 violent crimes, 14 crimes against women, and 7 
crimes against public order (figures per 10,000 population). 
However, in Naxalite-affected states, literacy rates did not 
exercise a significant effect on the number of violent crimes, 
or on the number of crimes against public order, in a dis-
trict but they did exert a significant upward influence on 
the number of crimes against women in a district. However, 
partially offsetting this “bad” literacy effect, a rise in the 
ratio of female to male literacy rates served to reduce the 
number of all three types of crime, with the largest impact 
being on violent crime and the smallest on crimes against 
women. 
The fifth point is that the absence of safe drinking water in 
a district, whether Naxalite or non-Naxalite, was associated 
with higher numbers of all three types of crime, with the ef-
fect being highest for violent crimes: a percentage point in-
crease in the number of habitations receiving safe drinking 
water would lead to the number of violent crimes in a dis-
trict falling by four per 10,000 population. The association 
between safe drinking water and violence is not surprising: 
16 One exception was the variable “forest cover.” 
This variable is important in explaining Naxalite 
activity because it presumably offers a suitable 
physical environment for armed activity. Since 
it might also be favourable for criminal activ-
ity, it was retained on grounds of consistency.
17 A percentage fall in the poverty rate 
would lead to the number of crimes against 
public order to increase by three.
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in villages and in the poorer urban areas of India, waiting to 
obtain water from a shared source (for example river, pond, 
tap) is a feature of daily life and provides a flash-point for 
arguments and quarrels and, in particular for inter-caste 
disputes as upper caste persons attempt to prevent lower 
caste persons from drawing water.
The sixth point is that the number of crimes in a district 
(whether Naxalite or non-Naxalite), was positively related 
to the number of adult males in a district. If adult males 
are viewed as the main perpetrators of crime, then an 
increase of 10,000 in their number was associated with an 
additional ten violent crimes; three crimes against women; 
and two crimes against public order (figures per 10,000 
population).18
Lastly, the presence of persons from the Scheduled Tribes 
in a district was associated with a higher average number of 
crimes in a district, in particular for violent crimes: for In-
dia in its entirety, a percentage point increase in the propor-
tion of persons from the Scheduled Tribes would lead the 
average number of violent crimes in a district to go up by 
thirteen per 10,000 population. Given the level of violence 
against persons from the Scheduled Tribes it is, perhaps, not 
surprising that Naxalite activity is focused in such areas. 
4. Estimation Results for the Naxalite Activity Equation
Using the district-level data, described above, we estimated 
a logit model in which the dependent variable (naxal) took 
the value 1 if a district had Naxalite activity (see Table 1) and 
the value 0 if it did not. This variable was defined for all the 
districts in the Indian states analysed here. Table 4 shows 
the results of estimating such a model, firstly on data for 
all the districts in India (but, as discussed earlier, exclud-
ing Jammu and Kashmir and the north-eastern states) and, 
then, on data restricted to the ten Indian states—Andhra 
Pradesh, Bihar, Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand, Karnataka, Mad-
hya Pradesh, Maharashtra, Orissa, Tamil Nadu, and West 
Bengal—containing districts affected by Naxalite activity. 
The columns of Tables 4 show the estimated odds ratios: 
a coefficient estimate greater than 1 implies that the prob-
ability of a district having Naxalite activity (Pr(naxal=1)) 
rises with an increase in the value of that variable while an 
estimate less than 1 implies that the probability falls.19 
18 The square of the adult male population was 
included to make the population effect non-linear.
19 The logit equation is 
1
Pr( 1)
exp{ } exp{ }
1 Pr( 1)
K
j
jk j j
kj
naxal
X z
naxal  for M coefficients, j j=1…M
and for values, X jk on k=1…K variables. The columns of Table 9 report report
Pr( 1)
1 Pr( 1)
j
jk j
naxal
X naxal
= exp( )k jk kX , which is the the change in the odds ratio, given a change
in the value of the kth variable, where Pr( 1) /(1 )z zjnaxal e e
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Table 4: Logit estimates of Naxalite activity
All states States affected by Naxalite activity+
Proportion of the district’s population which is rural 1.024* 1.038**
(1.65) (2.38)
District poverty rate 1.031*** 1.013
(2.89) (1.16)
District literacy rate 0.937*** 0.952***
(4.06) (2.91)
District female work participation 1.080*** 1.069***
(4.20) (3.46)
District coverage of safe drinking water 0.989* 0.989*
(1.82) (1.66)
District male population 1.033*** 1.030***
(4.38) (3.82)
District male population squared 1.000* 1.000*
(1.80) (1.68)
Proportion of district under forest cover 1.063*** 1.061***
(5.60) (4.98)
Proportion of district population belonging to the Scheduled Tribes 1.020 1.020
(1.62) (1.37)
Proportion of district population belonging to the Scheduled Castes 1.014 1.005
(0.73) (0.28)
Proportion of district population belonging to the Other Backward Classes 1.023** 1.015
(2.31) (1.42)
Pseudo-R2 0.32 0.28
LR test: χ2(11) 147 107
Observations 472 343
Notes:
Numbers in parentheses are z-scores
*** significant at 1 percent level; ** significant at 5 percent level; * significant at 10 percent level
+ Andhra Pradesh, Bihar, Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand, Karnataka, Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra, Orissa, Tamil Nadu, and West Bengal.
Table 4 shows that whether the equation was estimated over 
all the Indian states, or whether the estimation was con-
fined to the Naxalite-affected states, the probability of there 
being Naxalite activity in a district increased with a rise in 
its poverty rate and decreased with a rise in its literacy rate. 
Focusing on the results as they pertain to all the Indian dis-
tricts, the column headed “All States” in Table 4 shows that, 
in addition to poverty and literacy rates, five further factors 
affected the likelihood of Naxalite activity in districts:
(i)  More populous districts, as measured by the number 
of adult males in a district, were more likely to have 
Naxalite activity than less sparsely populated states.
(ii)  The greater the female participation in the workforce 
of a district, the more likely it was to have Naxalite 
 activity.20
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(iii)  Districts with a smaller coverage of safe drinking water 
were more likely to have Naxalite activity compared to 
districts where it was more usual for habitations to have 
safe drinking water.
(iv)  Districts with a larger coverage of forests were more 
likely to have Naxalite activity compared to districts 
with smaller forest cover.
(v)  Districts with a larger proportion of persons belonging 
to the Scheduled Tribes and to the Other Backward 
Classes were more likely to have Naxalite activity than 
districts containing a smaller proportion of persons 
from these groups but, for reasons discussed below, the 
relation between Scheduled Tribes and the probability 
of Naxalite activity was not significantly different from 
zero.
Results (iv) and (v) require some amplification. Per-
sons belonging to the Scheduled Tribes in India tend to 
live in areas which have relatively high forest cover. In 
consequence, there would be a high degree of collinear-
ity between the extent of a district’s forest cover and the 
proportion of its population that are from the Scheduled 
Tribes. After controlling for forest cover, there was still a 
weak, non-significant, relationship between the probability 
of Naxalite activity in a district and the share of Scheduled 
Tribe members in the district’s population. Second, as is 
well known, as the upper castes have abandoned farming 
as their traditional occupations to move into professional 
jobs, they have been replaced as small cultivators by persons 
from the Other Backward Classes: it is friction between the 
Other Backward Classes and the lower classes (Scheduled 
Tribes and Castes) that now largely provides the basis of 
inter-caste violence in India. 
For some of these variables, one cannot discount the pos-
sibility of reverse causality. For example, poverty may lead 
to Naxalite activity but, conversely, Naxailte activity in a 
district, by discouraging business and agricultural invest-
ment, may contribute to a district’s poverty. We were unable 
to disentangle the extent to which poverty leads to Naxalite 
activity and Naxalite activity leads to poverty. 
The explanatory power of the logit equations is shown in 
terms of the “Pseudo-R2.” The “Pseudo-R2” is a popular 
measure of the model’s performance in binary models and 
compares the maximised log-likelihood value of the full 
model (log L) to that obtained when all the coefficients 
except the intercept term are set to zero (log L0) and is 
defined as: 1-(log L/log L0). The measure has an intuitive ap-
peal in that it is bounded by 0 (all the slope coefficients are 
zero) and 1 (perfect fit). By the standards of discrete choice 
models, the R2 values reported in Table 4—0.32 and 0.28 
respectively—are high. 
5. Assessing the Model’s Predictive Power
One way of assessing the predictive ability of a model with 
a binary dependent variable is by constructing a 2x2 table 
of the “hits” and “misses” emanating from a prediction rule 
such that a district is regarded as being Naxalite-affected 
(naxal=1) or Naxalite-free (naxal=0) if, for a cut-off prob-
ability p*, the estimated probability Pr(naxal=1) > p*. Given 
a cut-off point p*, the sensitivity and the specificity of an 
equation are, respectively, the proportions of positive and 
negative cases that are correctly classified. 
20 In this connection it is important to note that 
both Maoist parties in India are explicitly concerned 
with issues relating to women at work (fair wages 
and freedom from harassment) and in the home (do-
mestic violence and the role of marriage in women’s 
oppression). Consequently, there has been a signifi-
cant increase in the number of women coming into 
the movement in Andhra Pradesh (Kannabiran et. 
al. 2004). Bhatia (2005) observes that an important 
aspect of the Naxalite movement in central India has 
been to fight for the dignity of India’s lower castes: as 
a direct consequence of Naxalite action the incidence 
of rape of lower caste women has fallen, lower caste 
children are able to attend school, and arbitary beat-
ings of lower caste persons are no longer tolerated.
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Table 5: Predictions from the logit model of Ta-
ble 9 (estimated over all districts in India)
True
Classified D ~D Total
+ 35 13 48
- 53 371 424
Total 88 384 472
Classified + if predicted Pr(D) >= .5
True: naxal=1; False: naxal=0
Correctly classified: 86.02%
Sensitivity 
Pr(+|D)
39.77%
Specificity 
Pr(-|~D)
96.61%
Positive predictive value 
Pr(D|+)
72.92%
Negative predictive value 
Pr(~D|-)
87.5%
Table 5 shows that with p*=0.5, 86 percent of the districts 
were correctly classified when the equation was estimated 
over all the districts and Table 6 shows that 81 percent of the 
districts were correctly classified when the equation was es-
timated over all the districts in the Naxalite-affected states. 
The model correctly identified districts with Naxalite activ-
ity in 40 percent of the cases (35 out of 88 districts, Table 5: 
Pr(+|D)) when it was estimated over all the districts in India 
and in 46 percent of the cases (40 out of 88 districts, Table 
6: Pr(+|D)) when it was estimated over all the districts in the 
ten Naxalite-affected states. 
Table 6: Predictions from the logit model of Table 9 (estimated 
over all districts in Naxalite-affected States in India)
True
Classified D ~D Total
+ 40 17 57
- 48 238 286
Total 88 255 343
Classified + if predicted Pr(D) >= .5
True: naxal=1; False: naxal=0
Correctly classified: 81.05%
Sensitivity 
Pr(+|D)
45.45%
Specificity 
Pr(-|~D)
93.33%
Positive predictive value 
Pr(D|+)
70.18%
Negative predictive value 
Pr(~D|-)
83.22%
From a different perspective, the likelihood of a district 
that was identified by the model as being Naxalite-affected 
actually being Naxalite-affected was 73 percent when the 
model was estimated over all the districts in India (35 out 
of 48 districts, Table 5: Pr(D|+)) and 70 percent when it was 
estimated over all the districts in the ten affected states (40 
out of 57 districts, Table 6: Pr(D|+)). However, the likelihood 
of a district identified by the model as not being Naxalite-
affected actually not being Naxalite-affected was 88 percent 
when the model was estimated over all the districts in India 
(371 out of 424 districts, Table 5: Pr(~D|-)) and 83 percent 
when it was estimated over all the districts in the ten af-
fected states (238 out of 286 districts, Table 6: Pr(~D|-)).
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Area under ROC curve = 0.8632
Figure 1: Sensitivity versus 1-specificity when the cutoff point is varied (all districts in India)
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Figure 2: Sensitivity versus 1-specificity when the cutoff point is varied (all districts in Naxalite-affected states of India
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One can also plot the graph of sensitivity versus (1-speci-
ficity) as the cut-off point p* is varied. The curve starts at 
(0,0) corresponding to p*=1: no positive case is correctly 
classified (sensitivity=0) and every case is classified nega-
tive (specificity =1 or 1-specificity=0); it ends at (1,1) corre-
sponding to p*=0: every positive case is correctly classified 
(sensitivity=1) and no case is classified as negative (specific-
ity =0 or 1-specificity=1). A model with no predictive power 
would be the 45° line connecting the two extreme points 
(0,0) and (1,1). The more bowed the curve, the greater the 
predictive power. Hence the area under the ROC curve (the 
receiver operating characteristic curve)—is a measure of the 
model’s predictive power: a model with no predictive power 
has an area of 0.5, while perfect predictive power implies an 
area of 1 (StataCorp 2001). Figures 1 and 2 show the ROC 
curves for, respectively, all districts in India and all districts 
in Naxalite-affected states: both curves are considerably 
bowed, with 86 percent of the area under the curve in Fig-
ure 1 and 83 percent in Figure 2, suggesting that the model 
has considerable predictive power.
6. Structural Effects
A feature of Naxalite activity in India is that it affects 
districts belonging to “poor” states (Bihar, Chhattisgarh, 
Jharkhand, Madhya Pradesh, Orissa, and Uttar Pradesh: 48 
out of 216 districts) as well as districts belonging to “rich” 
states (Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka, Maharashtra, Tamil 
Nadu, and West Bengal: 40 out of 133 districts). Rich states 
differ from poor states in two respects. 
1.  In respect of variables not included in the econometric 
equations (the residual term), they may have different 
levels of infrastructure in terms of roads, schools, security 
forces, etc. We refer to such differences as structural dif-
ferences
2.  In terms of the variables included in the equation, they 
may have different values for the included variables: for 
example, poverty rates may be lower and literacy rates 
may be higher in rich (Naxalite-affected) states compared 
to poor (Naxalite-affected) states. We refer to such differ-
ences as attribute differences.
Even if two districts had the same values of the included 
variables (poverty rates, literacy rates, forest cover), the fact 
that one was in a rich state and the other was in a poor state 
might mean that they would have different likelihoods of 
Naxalite activity. The reason for this is that the districts 
differ in terms of structure and, in econometric terms, this 
would manifest itself in coefficient differences between 
rich and poor states. Poverty rates, for example, might have 
different coefficients for rich-state districts compared to 
poor-state districts because these rates would be embedded 
in different structures.
In order to test for structural effects on the likelihood of 
Naxalite activity, we defined a dummy variable, D, which 
took the value 1 if a district belonged to a rich (Naxalite-af-
fected) state and 0 if it belonged to a poor (Naxalite-affect-
ed) state. All the explanatory variables were multiplied by 
this dummy variable and the resulting interaction variables 
were included in the equation as additional variables. If the 
coefficient on a interaction variable (say the rich-state lit-
eracy rate interaction) was significantly different from zero, 
then this would mean that the same value of the literacy 
rate would affect the probability of Naxalite activity differ-
ently, depending upon whether it pertained to a poor state 
district or a rich state district.
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Table 7 shows the results of estimating the Naxalite activity 
equation (Table 4) with interaction terms. This shows that 
the coefficients associated with two variables—the propor-
tion of a district’s population that was rural and the district 
poverty rate—differed significantly between rich and poor 
states: a given rate of poverty in a district was more likely to 
result in Naxalite activity if the district belonged to a rich 
than to a poor state. For all other variables there were no 
significant coefficient differences between districts in rich 
and poor states. 
7. Conclusions
This paper posed two questions: (1) is it a fact that there is 
more violence in Naxalite-affected districts compared to 
districts which are free of Naxalite activity? (2) can the fact 
that Naxalite activity exists in some districts of India, but 
not in others, be explained by differences in their economic 
and social conditions? 
The rapid spread of Naxalite activity in India, and the Mao-
ist movement in Nepal, has made finding answers to these 
questions a matter of urgency. The raw data showed that 
there was more violent crime, crimes against women, and 
crimes against public order in Naxalite-affected districts. 
However, our econometric results showed that, after con-
trolling for other variables, Naxalite activity in a district 
had, if anything, a dampening effect on its level of violent 
crime and crimes against women. 
Table 7: Logit estimates of Naxalite activity in districts of Naxalite-affected states with interaction terms
Odds ratio z
Proportion of district population which is rural 0.991 -0.39
Rich state x rural interaction 1.087 3.27
District poverty rate 1.037 2.11
Rich state x poverty rate interaction 0.956 -1.72
District literacy rate 0.949 -2.34
Rich state x poverty rate interaction 0.954 -1.36
District female work participation 1.026 0.83
Rich state x female work participation interaction 1.050 0.94
District coverage of safe drinking water 0.992 -0.93
Rich state x coverage of safe drinking water interaction 0.977 -1.28
District male population 1.033 1.72
Rich state x male population interaction 0.990 -0.45
District male population squared 0.999 -0.62
Rich state x male population interaction squared interaction 1.000 0.51
Proportion of district under forest cover 1.076 3.82
Rich state x forest cover interaction 0.968 -1.23
Proportion of district population belonging to the Scheduled Tribes 1.038 1.5
Rich state x Scheduled Tribes interaction 0.977 -0.59
Proportion of district population belonging to the Scheduled Castes 1.005 0.16
Rich state x Scheduled Castes interaction 1.038 0.88
Proportion of district population belonging to the Other Backward Classes 1.040 1.7
Rich state x Other Backward Classes interaction 0.984 -0.59
Rich states: Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka, Maharashtra, Tamil Nadu, and West Bengal.
Poor states: Bihar, Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand, Madhya Pradesh, Orissa, and Uttar Pradesh.
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The raw data also showed that Naxalite-affected districts 
had higher poverty rates and low literacy rates than districts 
which were Naxalite-free. This time however, our econo-
metric results showed that, even after controlling for other 
variables, the probability of a district being Naxalite-af-
fected rose with an increase in its poverty rate and fell with 
a rise in its literacy rate. So, one prong in an anti-Naxalite 
strategy would be to address the twin issues of poverty and 
illiteracy in India. 
In this context, however, there are two features of the 
Indian polity that are worrying. First, The Administrative 
Reforms Commission in its report “Combating Terrorism” 
has called for Naxalites to be dubbed “terrorists,” on a par 
with Islamic jihadis, rather than, as hitherto, “left-wing ex-
tremists” who resort to violence in pursuit of an  ideology.21 
Second, the village defence force, Salwa Judum, created by 
the Chattisgarh government to combat Naxalite activity in 
the state, may have to be scrapped after the National Hu-
man Rights Commission accused it of grave human rights 
abuses.22 Both features—labelling Naxalites as “terrorists” 
and human rights violations in combating them—fly in the 
face of the conclusions arrived at in this paper. 
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